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WHOSE HIGHEST AND BEST?
INCLUDING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
AND INDIVIDUAL LANDOWNERSHIP
IN THE HIGHEST AND BEST USE STANDARD
Brigid Sawyer+
In a bleak and fitting analysis of American culture, Chief Sitting Bull of the
Hunkpapa Lakota tribe stated, “The love of possessions is a disease in
[Americans]. . . . They claim this mother of ours, the earth, for their own use,
and fence their neighbor away . . . If America had been twice the size it is, there
still would not have been enough.”1 While private possession of property is a
well-accepted part of American culture, how we use that property is often a hotly
contested issue. Takings under eminent domain reveal an inherit conflict in
American ideology. What do we value more: land being used for its most
economically productive purpose or the individual rights of those first (or
currently) using the land?2 As this Comment illustrates, this conflict is hardly
limited to eminent domain and extends to other areas of land use and acquisition.
The earth has a finite amount of space to accommodate the estimated 7.74 billion
people in existence today.3 The answer to this question has important
implications for the ability of people to use their land as they want and as the
greater society needs.
This Comment explores the American history of the two competing goals of
land use: economic development and individual land ownership. The
similarities between founding-era philosophy on property, Native American
land takings, and eminent domain valuation are not readily apparent. Many
Native American land cases, and the legislation surrounding Native American
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J.D., The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law, expected May 2021; B.A.,
Salve Regina University, 2016. The creation of this Comment would not be possible without expert
guidance and support of Professor Lucia A. Silecchia, for whom the author is extremely grateful.
She also thanks the Catholic University Law Review staff and editors for their tireless and detailed
work. Finally, she thanks her family and friends for their unwavering love and support.
1. Sitting Bull, WIKIQUOTE, https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Sitting_Bull (last visited Jan. 30,
2021).
2. It is relevant to note that there are some land uses which do not solely provide an economic
use or an individual benefit—for example, roads, school, hospitals, prisons, and railroads provide
public benefits. These public benefits often give an economic or an individual benefit as well, such
as the creation of paths for commerce or the private ownership of public resources. It is the purpose
of this Comment to balance the goals of economic productivity of land with individual land
ownership when those goals arise as justification for the choices made regarding land.
3. The estimated world population grows in number every day and has likely grown
significantly since the publication of this article. See U.S. and World Population Clock, UNITED
STATES CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/popclock/?# (last visited Jan. 30, 2021).
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land, are not related to eminent domain.4 However, the theories and justification
surrounding Native America land takings speak to the tension between the desire
to use land in the most economically productive manner and the desire to respect
the individual landowner’s rights, both of which are echoed in founding-era
philosophy and eminent domain discussion.
Section I details the founding philosophies that have shaped American
understanding of land use. Section II explores the history of Native Americans’
land rights and takings. Section III discusses eminent domain, valuation in
connection with eminent domain, and the impact of Kelo v. City of New London.5
By analyzing these three seemingly different areas of law together, a more
appropriate definition of highest and best use can be created. Section IV points
to the connections between these subjects and Section V recommends
restructuring the highest and best use standard. Redefining this legal term of art
can create a standard that values both economic development and individual
property ownership.
I. FOUNDING ERA PHILOSOPHY ON PROPERTY LAW
In order to create a workable standard, the historical perspective on property
ownership must be reviewed. The desires for economic development and
individual land ownership date back long before the United States was formed.
Scholars discuss the tension between these and similar ideas that influenced the
Foundering Fathers.6 However, four philosophers and writers—John Locke,
William Blackstone, Adam Smith, and James Madison—had a significant
impact on the Founders’ political philosophies.7 These four individuals come
from the English common law system, Scottish economics, and American

4. See infra Section II.
5. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
6. William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the
Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 820–21 (1995) (discussing the differences in the
conception of property between liberalism, which promotes individual rights above all else, and
republicanism, which believes in limiting individual rights for the sake of the common interest).
7. David Adler, Legal History, Civic Literacy and a Liberal Arts Education: Building Blocks
for Civic Participation, 56 THE ADVOCATE 42, 43 (2013) (commenting on Locke’s influence on
the colonies and America in “preserv[ing] republican principles”); Schick v. United States, 195
U.S. 65, 69 (1904) (discussing the fact that Blackstone’s ideas were well known by the Founders);
James W. Ely Jr., The Constitution and Economic Liberty, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 27, 34
(2012) (noting that Smith was known by Founders but his work was not discussed at the
Constitutional Convention or ratifying debates, making his influence “hard to chart”); Andrew
Koppelman, Corruption of Religion and the Establishment Clause, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1831,
1877 (2009) (“Smith had a substantial impact on the thinking of the Framers of the Constitution . .
. .”); Richard S. Arnold, How James Madison Interpreted the Constitution, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267,
270 (1997) (“Mr. Madison was the prime mover in the drafting and adoption of the Constitution.
He was the quintessential Founder, known for generations by the title ‘Father of the
Constitution.’”).
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philosophy.8 The first, John Locke, theorized that property ownership came
from people mixing the labor they own with the land given to them in common.9
Locke stated, “God and his reason commanded him to subdue the earth, i.e.,
improve it for the benefit of life, and therein lay out something upon it that was
his own, his labour.”10 Labor, owned by each person individually, improved the
raw land and gave people ownership of the land which they improved.11
Another English writer, William Blackstone, defined property as, “that sole
and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external
things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the
universe.”12 He praised the concept of individualized property in land, stating
“[h]ad not therefore a separate property in lands, as well as movables, been
vested in some individuals, the world must have continued a forest, and men
have been mere animals of prey[.]”13 A Scottish economist, Adam Smith,
theorized that, in the progression toward property acquisition, society passes
through four different states: hunters, shepherds, agriculture, and commerce.14
As society passes through each stage, the property is more susceptible to theft
or harm and more laws need to be passed to protect property.15
James Madison wrote a short essay on property, which began by defining the
term with a quote similar to Blackstone’s definition: “that dominion which one
man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in exclusion of
every other individual.”16 Madison explained that property extends beyond
property of physical things to individual rights.17 He was also one of the
Federalist Papers’ authors.18 In Federalist 10, Madison cited unequal property
8. William Uzgalis, John Locke, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2018)
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke/; Sir William Blackstone, Relief Portrait, ARCHITECT OF
THE CAPITOL, https://www.aoc.gov/art/relief-portrait-plaques-lawgivers/sir-william-blackstone
(last visited Jan. 30, 2021); About Adam Smith, ADAM SMITH INSTITUTE,
https://www.adamsmith.org/about-adam-smith (last visited Jan. 30, 2021); James Madison, THE
WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-the-white-house/presidents/james-madison/
(last visited Jan. 30, 2021).
9. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 18 (Richard H. Cox, ed. 1982).
10. Id. at 21.
11. Id.
12. SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND APPLICABLE
TO REAL PROPERTY 1 (Alexander Leith & James Frederick Smith, eds. 1880),
https://archive.org/details/commentariesonl00leitgoog.
13. Id. at 7–8.
14. Adam Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence, in CLASSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERTY AND
PROPERTY 120, 120 (Richard A. Epstein ed., 2000).
15. Id. at 122.
16. James Madison, Property, in CLASSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERTY AND PROPERTY 185,
185 (Richard A. Epstein ed., 2000) (quoting The National Gazette (March 29, 1792)). Madison did
not quote Blackstone in his work. Id. at 185–87.
17. Id. at 185.
18. Federalist Papers: Primary Documents in American History, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers (last visited Jan. 30, 2021). The Federalist Papers were a
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distribution as a main source of American factions.19 He stated, “Those who
hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in
society.”20 However, he believed the large size of the country would prevent a
majority from organizing to take rights from another group of citizens.21
The combination of these views shows the philosophical climate prior to and
during the creation of the United States, as well as the theories that influenced
the American legal system for years to come. Locke was one of the only English
writers to influence eminent domain law with his writings22 and courts cite
Locke to ground their analysis of historical views of property rights and
protection against the government.23 Courts also regularly cite to Blackstone’s
definition and understanding of property.24 Further, since there was limited
discussion of property and the Takings Clause at the Constitutional Convention,
and Madison wrote the Takings Clause in the Constitution, his opinions are
believed to have been of significant importance to the Founders.25
series of essays published under the pseudonym “Publius” arguing for the ratification of the
Constitution. Id.
19. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison); Treanor, supra note 6, at 842; see also Jack
N. Rakove, The Madisonian Theory of Rights, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 245, 260 (1990)
(summarizing Madison’s characterization of the causes of faction).
20. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
21. Treanor, supra note 6, at 842–43.
22. WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & JOHN W. WEAVER, 17 WASH. PRAC., REAL ESTATE § 9.1 (2d
ed. 2020) (“[N]o [other] English writer attempted any systematic explanation of expropriation
theory [English eminent domain]; and not a single English decision on eminent domain has been
found from the pre-Revolutionary period.”).
23. See Kirby v. N.C. DOT, 786 S.E.2d 919, 924 (N.C. 2016) (citing Locke and Madison to
support the statement, “From the very beginnings of our republic we have jealously guarded against
the governmental taking of property.”); Tex. Rice Land Partners, Ltd. v. Denbury Green PipelineTexas, LLC, 363 S.W.3d 192, 204 (Tex. 2012) (showing that Locke’s statement on “preservation
of property rights [being] ‘[t]he great and chief end’ of government” was previously approved by
the Texas Supreme Court); Cannon v. State ex rel. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Transp., 807 A.2d 556,
566–67 (Del. 2002) (Holland, J., dissenting) (“Undoubtedly influenced by Locke, the rights of
property owners were characterized by the most prominent political theorists in the eighteenth
century as the ‘bulwark of freedom from arbitrary govemment [sic].’”).
24. GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1261–62 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting
Blackstone’s definition of property to create a historical background of Second Amendment rights);
John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 60 Fed. Cl. 230, 237 (Fed. Cl. 2004) (citing to
Blackstone to both define property and discuss the ability of the government to exact limits on
private property); Kirby, 786 S.E.2d at 923–24 (citing to Blackstone to support the statement, “The
fundamental right to property is as old as our state.”).
25. Treanor, supra note 6, at 791 (“There are apparently no records of discussion about the
meaning of the [Takings] clause in either Congress or, after its proposal, in the states. Madison’s
statements thus provide unusually significant evidence about what the clause was originally
understood to mean[.]”). See also Alberto B. Lopez, Weighing and Reweighing Eminent Domain’s
Political Philosophies Post-Kelo, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 237, 249 (2006). In addition to the
other philosophers mentioned in this Comment, Madison was strongly influenced by the ideas of
Hugo de Groot (Grotius), who first paired the words “eminent domain” and articulated the idea that
land could be taken by the government if remuneration of funds was given. Id. at 245–46, 249–50.
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II. NATIVE AMERICAN LAND TAKINGS
A. Tension Between Founding-Era Theories and America’s Desire for Native
American Land
The idea that property is owned by those who use their skills and occupation
to acquire it, alongside the protection that society and government afford,26 had
to be balanced with the actions of European and, later, American settlers.27 In
Johnson v. M’Intosh, the Supreme Court was faced with two conflicting lines of
title, one tracing back to Native American ownership and the other acquired by
the United States from Great Britain through the Revolutionary War.28 The
defendants, who acquired their chain of title through the United States, argued
against any property rights of indigenous people, citing Locke and other
philosophers as the basis for this line of thought.29 In his majority opinion, Chief
Justice Marshall agreed that the defendants had the true line of title but did not
go as far as the defendants urged to deprive Native Americans of all land rights.30
He stated, “[t]he absolute ultimate title has been considered as acquired by
discovery, subject only to the Indian title of occupancy, which title the
discoverers possessed the exclusive right of acquiring.”31 In doing so, Marshall
rode a fine line of acknowledging that, by occupying the land, the Native
American tribes had a limited right to occupy it and the “discoverers” were the
only authority to which the Native Americans could sell their land.32
Marshall continued his theory of discovery with right to occupancy title in
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia and Worcester v. Georgia.33 Both cases dealt with
Native American sovereignty and deciding whether state laws could be enforced
against Native Americans.34 In Cherokee Nation, the Court refused to rule on
whether the laws of Georgia could bind the Cherokee Nation but found that the
Native American tribe was not a foreign nation within the meaning of the

26. See supra Section I.
27. See JEDEDIAH PURDY, THE MEANING OF PROPERTY 68 (2010) (“The Anglo-American
account of the legitimacy of imperialism depended essentially on a vision of property that made it,
as it was for Blackstone, the linchpin of social order, progress, and sovereignty.”).
28. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 571 (1823).
29. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 1823 U.S. LEXIS 293, 32–33 (1823).
30. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 592.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 591. Justice Marshall said this opinion is in line with the following, established
principle: “[t]he absolute ultimate title has been considered as acquired by discovery, subject only
to the Indian title of occupancy, which title the discoverers possessed the exclusive right of
acquiring.” Id. at 592. Occupancy is described as “full and exclusive possession, use, and
enjoyment of the land described . . . .” COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 15.03
(Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2012).
33. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6
Pet.) 515 (1832) superseded by statute as stated in Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S.
545, 562–63 (1983).
34. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 15; Worcester, 31 U.S. at 536.
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Constitution.35 In Worcester, the Court found that Georgia state laws which
interfered with the relationship between the United States and the Cherokee
Nation were “repugnant to the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United
States.”36
Eminent domain is the government’s power to take land for public use.37
Formal exercise of this power is not often a point at issue in Native American
land taking cases, since discovery, removal, and allotment38 provided sufficient
justification for such land takings.39 However, in Cherokee Nation v. Southern
Kansas Railway Co., the right to use eminent domain produced a chink in the
armor of Marshall’s theory of discovery with right to occupancy.40 In this case,
the Cherokee Nation argued that the United States could not use eminent domain
to take land to build a railroad because the Nation was a sovereign state and held
the right of eminent domain itself.41 Justice Harlan, writing for the majority,
disagreed with the Nation’s position and, relying on Marshall’s opinion in
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, said the Nation was a “dependent political
communit[y],” and its separate status from the United States did not make it
sovereign.42 He said that, even though the land was held in fee simple by the
Nation (due to treaties between it and the United States government), the land
was “held subject to the authority” of the United States.43
B. Legislative Response to Takings
Early negotiations between the United States government and the Native
American tribes were conducted through treaties and legislation.44 On May 28,
1830, Congress passed the Indian Removal Act, allowing the President to
exchange land in the west “for the whole or any part or portion of the territory
claimed and occupied by [a Native American] tribe or nation[.]”45 Treaties
formed the basis of the United States’ removal process of Native Americans
from their eastern homelands to the west.46 President Andrew Jackson, both
before and after the Cherokee Nation v. Georgia and Worcester decisions, put

35. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 19–20.
36. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 561–62.
37. Eminent Domain, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). See infra Section III.A.
38. See infra Section II.B.
39. See generally Stacy L. Leeds, By Eminent Domain or Some Other Name: A Tribal
Perspective on Taking Land, 41 TULSA L. REV. 51, 58–67 (2005) (comparing the current use of
eminent domain with the taking of Native American lands through discovery, removal, allotment,
and surplus lands given to white settlors).
40. Cherokee Nation v. S. Kan. Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641 (1890).
41. Id. at 648–49.
42. Id. at 653–54.
43. Id. at 654, 656–57.
44. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 1.03 (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2017).
45. Indian Removal Act, ch. 71, 4 Stat. 411, § 2 (1830).
46. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 44.
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pressure on Native Americans to enter into treaties that would give up their
eastern land and require, either explicitly or implicitly, that they move
westward.47
As time went on, white settlors began moving westward, and removal policies
were soon replaced with reservations—smaller areas of land for Native
American tribes to live on—and allotment—assigning land to individual
members of tribes.48 There was a belief that common ownership of property
within Native American tribes was hampering development.49 Allotment was
supposed to help assimilate Native Americans into American society.50 As
Kenneth Bobroff described it, “[b]y instilling individualism in the wild Indian,
allotment would bring to him the incentive to work and acquire. With private
property would come salvation and civilization.”51 The Indian Allotment Act
was passed, which provided that “the President of the United States . . . is
authorized, whenever in his opinion any reservation or any part thereof of such
Indians is advantageous for agricultural and grazing purposes . . . to allot the
lands in said reservation in severalty to any Indian located thereon[.]”52
However, this policy did not create Native American farmers; rather, it saddled
Native Americans with property tax debt, fractioned heirs, and ultimately left
room for white settlors to purchase or adversely possess the land.53 According
to Bobroff, “[b]y 1934, when the Federal government ended allotment, the

47. Id. The United States’ treaties with the Cherokee Nation and the Creek Nation exemplify
the interactions between the government and many Native American tribes during this period. Id.
The Cherokee Nation signed a treaty which required it to move west, and the journey subsequently
became known as the “Trail of Tears.” Id. The Creek Nation signed a treaty giving it the option
to create allotments of the land; but, after white settlors forcefully took it, the military forced the
Creek Nation to move west. Id.
48. Id. Reservations were an important part of the recent Supreme Court case, McGirt v.
Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020). The Court found that a Creek Nation reservation created by
Congress remains “Indian nation” for the purposes of a statute assigning jurisdiction over crimes
where the accused are Native American. Id. at 2459–60, 2478, 2482. This finding was based on
Congress’ creation of the reservation without a subsequent termination of that reservation. Id. at
2482. Justice Gorsuch, writing for the majority, stated that, because the reservation was promised
to the Creek Nation perpetually, “[i]f Congress wishes to withdraw its promises, it must say so.”
Id. While this ruling is a step toward increased respect for the Creek Nation’s land, one ambassador
for the Creek Nation stated, “[n]ot one inch of land changed hands today . . . All that happened was
clarity was brought to potential prosecutions within Creek Nation.” Jack Healy & Adam Liptak,
Landmark Supreme Court Ruling Affirms Native American Rights in Oklahoma, N.Y. TIMES (July
9,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/09/us/supreme-court-oklahoma-mcgirt-creeknation.html.
49. Leeds, supra note 39, at 65.
50. Kenneth H. Bobroff, Retelling Allotment: Indian Property Rights and the Myth of
Common Ownership, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1559, 1565 (2001).
51. Id. at 1571.
52. Indian Allotment (Dawes) Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, § 1 (1887).
53. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 44, § 1.04; Bobroff, supra note 50, at 1618.
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policy had cost Indians almost 90 million acres, two-thirds of the land they
owned fifty years earlier.”54
Allotment ended with the passage of Indian Reorganization Act (IRA).55 By
the 1930s, attitudes changed as to the assimilation of Native Americans into
American culture, and a desire emerged to promote economic potential within
Native American communities.56 On June 18, 1934, Congress passed the IRA,
which provided “[t]hat hereafter no land of any Indian reservation . . . shall be
allotted in severalty to any Indian.”57 The Act went on to state, “[t]he Secretary
of the Interior, if he shall find it to be in the public interest, is hereby authorized
to restore to tribal ownership the remaining surplus lands of any Indian
reservation heretofore opened . . . to sale, or any other form of disposal by
Presidential proclamation[.]”58 A main purpose of this law was to promote
economic development, which in turn would support Native American selfgovernance.59 Pursuant to this Act, some land was taken in trust, meaning “that
the federal government holds title to the land in trust for tribes or individual
Indians.”60 But the impact was meek, even after the Bureau of Indian Affairs
began attempting to acquire land for tribal owners.61 While the IRA decreased
the rate at which Native Americans lost their land, it did not address allotment
fractionation, and only a small amount of lands were returned to Native
Americans.62
54. Bobroff, supra note 50, at 1561.
55. Indian Reorganization (Wheeler-Howard Law) Act, chs. 575–76, 48 Stat. 984 (1934).
56. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 44, § 1.05.
57. Indian Reorganization Act § 1.
58. Id. § 3.
59. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court and Federal Indian Policy, 85 NEB. L. REV.
121, 144 (2006). The IRA allowed tribes to adopt a constitution and bylaws to “organize
themselves under the . . . Act.” Indian Reorganization Act, Procedural Guide, 11 FED. PROC.
FORMS § 41:89 (2020).
60. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-11-543T, INDIAN ISSUES: OBSERVATIONS
ON SOME UNIQUE FACTORS THAT MAY AFFECT ECONOMIC ACTIVITY ON TRIBAL LANDS 3
(2011), https://www.gao.gov/assets/130/125965.pdf. Trust status frees the land from state and local
taxes as well as zoning ordinances. Id. The GAO noted some uncertainty in the land in trust due
to issues with the processing of applications by the Bureau of Indian Affairs and a 2009 Supreme
Court decision. Id. at 4. In that case, the Court ruled that the language in the IRA—“now under
federal jurisdiction”—which allowed the Secretary of the Interior to hold land in trust for Native
Americans, meant “those tribes that were under the federal jurisdiction of the United States when
the IRA was enacted in 1934.” Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 395 (2009); see also Bethany C.
Sullivan & Jennifer L. Turner, Enough is Enough: Ten Years of Carcieri v. Salazar, 40 PUB. LAND
& RES. L. REV. 37 (2019) (analyzing the challenges and impacts of Carcieri).
61. G. William Rice, The Indian Reorganization Act, The Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, and a Proposed Carcieri “Fix”, 45 IDAHO L. REV. 575, 589 (2009).
62. Jered T. Davidson, Comment, This Land is Your Land, This Land is My Land? Why the
Cobell Settlement Will Not Resolve Indian Land Fractionation, 35 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 575, 586
(2011). The concern at the time was mostly focused on assimilating Native Americans into
American culture. Kelsey J. Waples, Extreme Rubber-Stamping: The Fee-to-Trust Process of the
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 251, 261 (2012). The Department of Interior
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III. HIGHEST AND BEST USE
A. Eminent Domain
Beyond Native American land takings cases, eminent domain is another area
of law that sees the tension between economic development and respect for
individual land ownership. Eminent domain is a right of a governing body,
either under the natural law theory or the concept of sovereignty.63 The natural
law theory says that eminent domain power in a constitution merely recognizes
that a government has power under the natural law, and individuals subject to
this power must be compensated for their land loss.64 The concept of
sovereignty comes from the idea that eminent domain power lies with the
sovereign, and positive laws must restrict that power.65 The Massachusetts
Supreme Court aptly stated, “[b]y force of this power, back of all private titles
lies the eminent domain as an inherent attribute of organized government.”66
The United States Constitution limits the federal government’s eminent domain
powers with the following sentence: “[N]or shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.”67 Each state in the country also has the
power of eminent domain.68

acted on its own discretion to acquire lands in trust prior to 1980 and, even after a more official
process was enacted in 1980, “scholars argued that the process was too similar to the pre-1980
unpublished guidelines . . . .” Frank Pommersheim, Land into Trust: An Inquiry into Law, Policy,
and History, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 519, 527 (2013). Congress enacted the Indian Land Consolidation
Act (ILCA) in 1983 in an attempt to correct some of the problems of Native American land
fractionation and to “[consolidate] tribal lands through sale, purchase, or other exchanges.”
Davidson, supra note 62, at 587. The ILCA, however, included a provision which forced land to
escheat to the tribe when there was only a small, fractional share of property interest. Leeds, supra
note 39, at 68. The Supreme Court found this action to be an unconstitutional taking, and Congress
unsuccessfully attempted multiple revisions to the ILCA. Id. Congress also passed the American
Indian Probate Reform Act (AIPRA) to reduce fractionation by changing the rules of intestate
succession of heirs which has had some benefits reducing further fractionation but does not correct
previous fractionation and sometimes dismisses tribal land choices. Davidson, supra note 62, at
591, 594.
63. 1 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.14(1)–(2) (Matthew Bender ed., 2020).
64. Young v. McKenzie, 3 Ga. 31, 43–44 (1847); 1 NICHOLS, supra note 63, § 1.14(1).
65. Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 406 (1878) (“The clause found in the Constitutions
of the several States providing for just compensation for property taken is a mere limitation upon
the exercise of the right.”). The court in Boom Co. v. Patterson highlighted that the right of eminent
domain is inherent to sovereignty. Id. Societies have historically varied in whether this includes a
payment of just compensation. See 1 NICHOLS, supra note 63, §§ 1.2, 1.14(3).
66. Weeks v. Grace, 80 N.E. 220, 220 (Mass. 1907).
67. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
68. See, e.g., Dalche v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 49 F.2d 374, 381 (E.D. La. 1931).
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B. Valuing Land
In order for there to be payment of just compensation, the land taken in an
eminent domain proceeding must be valued.69 Land is valued by two factors:
fair market value (or market value) and the land’s “highest and best use.” The
Mississippi Supreme Court described fair market value as, “the amount of
money which could be obtained on the open market at a voluntary sale of
property; the amount that a purchaser who is willing, but not required to buy,
would pay, and the amount that a seller who is willing, but not required to sell,
would accept.”70 It is the price of a free market transaction for goods or services:
the lowest price the seller will sell at and the highest price the buyer will
purchase at.71 However, fair market value is only one part of valuation because,
unlike a typical transaction, an eminent domain case does not involve a willing
seller.72
The highest and best use standard is also applied in valuation. In the same
year that Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act, the Supreme Court
decided Olson v. United States, where a landowner wanted the “actual use and
special adaptability” of their land included in condemnation valuation.73 The
Court stated,
The highest and most profitable use for which the property is adaptable
and needed or likely to be needed in the reasonably near future is to
be considered, not necessarily as the measure of value, but to the full
extent that the prospect of demand for such use affects the market
value while the property is privately held.74

69. 4 NICHOLS, supra note 63, § 13.01(2); see also Compensation, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining “just compensation” as “a payment by the government for
property it has taken under eminent domain—usu. the property’s fair market value, so that the
owner is theoretically no worse off after the taking.”). This proceeding is also called condemnation.
Condemnation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
70. Tunica Cnty. v. Matthews, 926 So. 2d 209, 216 (Miss. 2006) (quoting Bear Creek Water
Ass’n v. Town of Madison, 416 So. 2d 399, 402 (Miss. 1982)); see also United States v.
Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123–25 (1950) (finding that some alternatives, such as
ceiling prices, can be used when this fair market value is not an accurate measure of just
compensation).
71. Law
of
Supply
and
Demand,
INVESTOPEDIA
(Nov.
29,
2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/law-of-supply-demand.asp. Valuation is determined as of
the date of the taking. United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 29 (1984); AMTRAK v.
Certain Temp. Easements Above the R.R. Right of Way in Providence, R.I., 357 F.3d 36, 39 (1st
Cir. 2004). Contra 1 JAMES C. BONBRIGHT, THE VALUATION OF PROPERTY 61 (1937) (stating that
the “fair” in fair market value is sometimes used by courts to consider equity in eminent domain
valuation and that the willing buyer and seller model is illusory because the actual market
conditions are unknown).
72. D. BENJAMIN BARROS & ANNA P. HEMINGWAY, PROPERTY LAW 833 (2015).
73. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 248 (1934).
74. Id. at 255.
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This was one of the first applications of the highest and best use standard. A
similar definition was also used for many years by the Appraisal Institute.75 The
Appraisal Institute is a professional organization of real estate appraisers, and its
members specialize in “valuation-related services.”76 However, in the
fourteenth edition of the Appraisal Institute’s publication, The Appraisal of Real
Estate, the definition was simplified to “[t]he reasonably probable use of
property that results in the highest value.”77 The original elements of “(1) legal
permissibility, (2) physical possibility, [and] (3) financial feasibility”78 are still
considered, but the primary concerns are probability of use and the highest value
of the land.79
If a government wanted to purchase property for public use, and property
owners were always willing to sell at fair market value, there would be no need
for the government to use eminent domain.80 Courts have commented on this
problem before, and the Seventh Circuit has stated that “[f]ull compensation will

75. James D. Masterman, Proving Highest and Best Use, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY
MATERIALS: EMINENT DOMAIN AND LAND VALUATION LITIGATION 89, 91 (2005).
Highest and best use is the most profitable use the property will bring in light of its
zoning, economic, environmental, legal, practical, social and physical characteristics
unique to the property. The four criteria that must be met are: (1) legal permissibility,
(2) physical possibility, (3) financial feasibility, and (4) maximum profitability,
sometimes phrased as maximum productivity.
Id.
76. JOEL R. BRANDES, LAW & THE FAMILY NY FORMS § 97:1 (2d ed., 2020). “The Appraisal
Institute is a global membership association of professional real estate appraisers. The majority of
Appraisal Institute members are practicing real estate appraisers and property analysts who provide
valuation-related services[.]” Id. See also ROBERT D. FEDER & P. BARTON DELACY, VALUING
SPECIFIC ASSETS DIVORCE § 12.09 (2020); Masterman, supra note 75, at 92; About Us, APPRAISAL
INSTITUTE, https://www.appraisalinstitute.org/about/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2021). Other appraisal
organizations and standards exist as well. See generally WILLIAM S. YETKE & LARY B. COWART,
VALUATION STRATEGIES DIVORCE § 6.61 (5th ed. 2020). Additionally, the federal government
and many states depend on the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice (USPAP),
created by the Appraisal Foundation, for the basis of their real estate appraiser regulations. 7
NICHOLS, supra note 63, §§ G4.03(1), (4)(b).
77. Mark D. Savin, Highest and Best Use and the Challenges of the Market, in ALI CLE
COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS (2015) (quoting APPRAISAL INSTITUTE, THE APPRAISAL OF REAL
ESTATE (2013)). Under the USPAP, “an appraiser must ‘develop an opinion of the highest and
best use of the real estate’ after analyzing the relevant legal, physical and economic factors.”
Brandee L. Caswell, Anatomy of an Appraisal: How do Eminent Domain Lawyers Review and
Analyze Appraisal Reports?, in ALI CLE COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS (2020). These factors
include: “Legal permissibility[,] Physical possibility[,] Financial feasibility[,] Maximal
productivity[,] Reasonable probability issues[,] Need for supporting expertise in HBU analysis[,]
Proper application of Project Influence Rule in HBU determination[,] Alternative or multiple
highest and best uses[, and] Interim uses[.]” Id.
78. Masterman, supra note 75, at 91.
79. Savin, supra note 77; see also Michael Rikon, The Highest and Best Use Concept in
Condemnation, 82 APR N.Y. STATE BAR J. 44 (2010).
80. BARROS & HEMINGWAY, supra note 72, at 833.
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often exceed fair market value—many people would not sell their home for its
fair market value, if only because of moving expenses.”81
The Florida Constitution has a requirement of full compensation when the
state government uses eminent domain82 and the Florida Supreme Court has
ruled that moving expenses fall within the requirement for full compensation,
saying that “[a] person who is put to expense through no desire or fault of his
own can only be made whole when his reasonable expenses are included in the
compensation.”83 By contrast, the Arkansas Constitution does not have a
requirement of full compensation;84 however, the state’s Supreme Court has
ruled that just compensation is defined by full compensation and that full
compensation requires interest paid dating back to the time of the government’s
entry, beyond the fair market value of the property.85
C. Kelo v. City of New London
Eminent domain and the economic productivity of land came to a head in Kelo
v. City of New London.86 In this case, the landowners contested whether the
taking of the property for economic development constituted a valid public use
and whether the property could be transferred to private owners “simply because
the new owners may make more productive use of the property.”87 Of the
landowners, one made “extensive improvements to her house” and another lived
in her house since birth—the last sixty years of which were with her husband.88
The properties, owned by these and other petitioners, were not of poor quality
or upkeep; rather, they were condemned due to their location in the same area
where the community development project was planned.89 The Court, citing
precedent of allowing economic development as a public use, found that the
economic development project was a public use.90 The Court pushed the
ultimate responsibility for deciding public use to the states by saying, “[f]or
81. United States v. Norwood, 602 F.3d 830, 834 (7th Cir. 2010); see 1 BONBRIGHT, supra
note 71, at 72 (“The very value that I place upon my present dwelling is influenced by the fact that
my ownership of it saves me from incurring these so-called ‘incidental losses.’”).
82. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6(a).
83. Jacksonville Expressway Auth. v. Henry G. Du Pree Co., 108 So. 2d 289, 292 (Fla. 1958).
At the time of this case, that constitutional provision was located in FLA. CONST. art. XVI § 29. Id.
at 290.
84. ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 22 (requiring only just compensation for property takings by the
state of Arkansas).
85. Ark. State Highway Comm’n v. Stupenti, 257 S.W.2d 37, 40 (Ark. 1953).
86. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
87. Id. at 496 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see also id. at 472–73.
88. Id. at 475.
89. Id. The majority opinion did not discuss the value these qualities added to the property.
See generally id. at 472–90.
90. Id. at 480–83. The Court cited to Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Haw. Hous.
Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); and Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984), to
illustrate economic development as a public use. Id. at 480–82.
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more than a century, our public use jurisprudence has wisely eschewed rigid
formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures broad latitude
in determining what public needs justify the use of the takings power.”91 The
Court also found that the transfer of land to a private party, even though it
benefitted the new private owners, fell within public use because it was within
“the government’s pursuit of a public purpose.”92 The Court concluded by
saying that such results may seem harsh, even after just compensation payment;
however, states had the option to impose stricter public use limits on
themselves.93
D. Impact of Kelo
In the aftermath of Kelo, many states heeded the recommendation of the
majority and placed restrictions on their own eminent domain powers through
legislation, ballot measures, and sometimes judicial decisions.94 Since 2006,
forty-seven states have amended their eminent domain laws.95 There are many
commonalities between these changes, but the most relevant for the purposes of
this Comment are the narrowing of the public use definition and the increasing
compensation for landowners in eminent domain cases.96 Kansas’s eminent
domain statute provides an apt example of such a restriction, because it prohibits
the government from transferring land to a private party except in certain
enumerated circumstances.97 The statute allows eminent domain for economic
development purposes, but caveats this broad exception with the following
statement: “If the legislature authorizes eminent domain for private economic
development purposes, the legislature shall consider requiring compensation of
at least 200% of fair market value to property owners.”98 At the federal level,
91. Id. at 483. The Court applied the local legislature deference principle to the case at hand
by stating, “[t]hose who govern the City were not confronted with the need to remove blight in the
Fort Trumbull area, but their determination that the area was sufficiently distressed to justify a
program of economic rejuvenation is entitled to our deference.” Id.
92. Id. at 485.
93. Id. at 489.
94. 1 MICHAEL ALLEN WOLF, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN SPECIAL ALERT § SA.01
(2019); 1 JULIUS L. SACKMAN ET AL., NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN SPECIAL ALERT, § SA.02
(2020).
95. WOLF, supra note 94; Dana Berliner, Looking Back Ten Years After Kelo, 125 YALE
L.J.F. 82, 86–88 (2015).
96. SACHMAN, supra note 94.
97. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 26-501b (2006).
98. § 26-501b(f). Other states have similar provisions providing for additional compensation
above fair market value. For example, a homestead taking in Missouri is compensated for 125%
of the fair market value. MO. ANN. STAT. § 523.039(2) (West 2006). Similarly, in Indiana, the
taking of agricultural land entitles the owner to either 125% of the fair market value of the land or
an ownership interest in other “agricultural land that is equal in acreage to the parcel” lost through
eminent domain. IND. CODE ANN. § 32-24-4.5-8(a)(1)(A) (West 2019). In Michigan, the taking
of a principal residence must be given 125% of the fair market value of the property. MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 213.23(5) (West 2007).
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Congress attempted to create similar laws with broad prohibitions against
takings for non-public uses, and allocated funding to revitalize areas with vacant,
run-down, or foreclosed on buildings.99
Even in the fifteen years since Kelo, little is known of whether eminent
domain actions have increased or decreased due to the decision.100 In a report
to Congress in 2006, the Government Accountability Office indicated that it had
limited data on the impact of eminent domain due to its use by different state
agencies and the fact that “it is difficult to establish measures to quantify the
wide range of costs and benefits to individual communities of projects involving
eminent domain.”101 One of the landowners’ attorneys in Kelo, Dana Berliner,
wrote an article, Looking Back Ten Years After Kelo, where she analyzed Kelo’s
effect had and state responses on eminent domain actions.102 She focused on
New York, one of the three states that has not enacted significant restrictions on
eminent domain, and noted that courts there have allowed eminent domain to be
used for “private development around a sports stadium, the expansion of
Columbia University, the replacement of a CVS with a Walgreens, and the
enhancement of a golf course.”103 She also pointed out the inconsistency in state
eminent domain laws since the Kelo decision.104
State definitions of “blight” (endorsed by the Supreme Court in Berman v.
Parker105) can be expansive, allowing eminent domain in areas considered
“blighted” or in need of revitalization.106 Eminent domain cases based on blight
are those “involv[ing] condemnation of land where the articulated public use is
the removal of undesirable or unhealthy living conditions.”107 While legal
challenges to blight takings have seen recent success due to courts that are more

99. WOLF, supra note 94.
100. Meron Werkneh, Retaking Mecca: Healing Harlem Through Restorative Just
Compensation, 51 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 225, 233 (2017).
101. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-07-28, EMINENT DOMAIN: INFORMATION
ABOUT ITS USES AND EFFECT ON PROPERTY OWNERS AND COMMUNITIES IS LIMITED 3, 5 (2006),
https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0728.pdf. Congress mandated this study. Id. at 2. As of the date
of this article, no follow-up report has been issued by this office to determine if there is more
information in the years since the Kelo decision. See https://www.gao.gov/index.html (search
“eminent domain” and date restrict to 12/1/2006 through 09/07/2020).
102. Berliner, supra note 95, at 84.
103. Id. at 89. Arkansas and Massachusetts are the other two states which have not changed
their eminent domain laws. Id.
104. Id. at 90.
105. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 484 n.13 (2005) (citing Berman v. Parker,
348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954)).
106. See Werkneh, supra note 100, at 238, 241–42; Patricia Hureston Lee, Shattering “Blight”
and the Hidden Narratives that Condemn, 42 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 29, 51–52 (2017); Leeds,
supra note 39, at 55; Kaur v. N.Y. State Urb. Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721, 733–34 (N.Y. 2010)
(finding that development of Columbia University’s campus in a blighted area was a public use).
107. Leeds, supra note 39, at 55.
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critical of broad blight standards,108 litigation in these cases is often too
expensive for those affected to dispute and challenges may be limited by
states.109 Additionally, people of color and people in disadvantaged classes
often have a greater likelihood of being impacted by a state’s definition of
blight.110
Wesley W. Horton, an attorney for the city in Kelo, also wrote a response to
the decision entitled Kelo is Not Dred Scott.111 He cited Supreme Court
precedent, arguing that economic development as public use was not a new
development in eminent domain jurisprudence.112 He also pointed out that the
courts are still available to landowners as a remedy if the government uses
eminent domain improperly.113 J. Peter Byrne, a Professor at Georgetown
University Law Center, argues that bias against minorities in economic
development projects was prevalent in the 1950s and 1960s but is no longer as
significant of a problem, due to local control over such projects and growth in
minority political power.114
Immediately post-Kelo, alternative solutions to economic development as a
public use became a popular topic for scholars, mostly focused on compensation
for personal value. John Fee suggested valuing homes based on their “intrinsic
value” rather than simply market value.115 He argued that this position is
consistent with the remedies available in tort law, such as emotional harm in
wrongful death actions and sentimental damages for loss of personal property.116
He recommended a graduated, statutory adjustment for “personal detachment”
from the home based on length of time in the home.117
Other alternatives include Kelianne Chamberlain’s suggestion to create a
system where landowners impacted by eminent domain would receive a share
of the revenue from the project their land was taken for, implemented either

108. Dana Berliner et al., Challenging the Right-to-Take: A Whirlwind Tour of Cases and
Issues, in ALI CLE COURSE MATERIALS (2015).
109. Lee, supra note 106, at 49; Berliner, supra note 108. Berliner stated, “The past 10 years
of redevelopment litigation indicates that courts now examine [blight definitions] much more
carefully and with less deference then [sic] they once did.” Berliner, supra note 108.
110. Leeds, supra note 39, at 56.
111. See generally Wesley W. Horton & Brendon P. Levesque, Kelo is Not Dred Scott, 48
CONN. L. REV. 1405 (2016).
112. Id. at 1414–15.
113. Id. at 1425. The authors go on to suggest a more developed version of Justice Kennedy’s
test, looking more carefully at what constitutes a “public use.” Id. at 1426–27.
114. J. Peter Byrne, Eminent Domain and Racial Discrimination: A Bogus Equation, in THE
CIVIL RIGHTS IMPLICATIONS OF EMINENT DOMAIN ABUSE 51, 51 (2014),
https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/docs/FINAL_FY14_Eminent-Domain-Report.pdf.
115. John Fee, Eminent Domain and the Sanctity of Home, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 783, 804
(2006).
116. Id. at 805.
117. Id. at 818.
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through statutes or judicial decisions.118 Similarly, Dale Orthner argued for a
system based on the same premise with a “compensation premium” of fifty
percent above market price, justified by the idea that landowners reap some of
the rewards that the economic development plan would bring to the
community.119 Professor Alberto Lopez suggested including a subjective harm
calculation in the valuation of property under eminent domain.120 He argued
that “the principle that just compensation is limited to the value of the soil lost
by an owner ignores the human element inherent in the [eminent domain] clause
and overlooks the historical foundations of eminent domain.”121 Under his
theory, a subjective standard would allow for more just compensation for
landowners affected by eminent domain.122
IV. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT VERSUS INDIVIDUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
In tracing the origins of economic development and individual property rights,
it is important to begin with historical perspectives on these concepts. Locke,
Blackstone, Smith, and Madison all touched on the conflict between these ideas
in their own unique ways. They either pointed to the importance of individual
property ownership or to the importance of government and society to manage
these rights.123 Locke discussed the increased value of privately owned
property, as opposed to that left in common, due to a person’s labor on the
property.124 He went on to say that people enter into society, and the sovereign
regulates their private property.125 Connecting these concepts, he argued, “[t]he
great and chief end therefore, of men’s uniting into commonwealths, and putting
themselves under government, is the preservation of their property.”126
Blackstone had a greater focus on the way that the creation of society
impacted property ownership. Blackstone stated that “the right of possession

118. Kelianne Chamberlain, Comment, Unjust Compensation: Allowing a Revenue-Based
Approach to Pipeline Takings, 14 WYO. L. REV. 77, 96, 101–02 (2014).
119. Dale Orthner, Perspective on Kelo v. City of New London: Toward a More “Just”
Compensation in Eminent Domain, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 429, 457–58 (2007). Another
compensation definition would give five adjustments over fair market value, depending on specific
circumstances of the land. Shaun Hoting, The Kelo Revolution, 86 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 65,
122 (2009).
120. Lopez, supra note 25, at 299.
121. Id. at 294.
122. Id. at 292–93.
123. See supra Section I.
124. LOCKE, supra note 9, at 24. “For the provisions serving to the support of human life,
produced by one acre of enclosed and cultivated land, are (to speak much within compass) ten times
more, than those which are yielded by an acre of land, of an equal richness, lying waste in
common.” Id.
125. Id. at 31. Locke stated, “[f]or in governments the laws regulate the right of property, and
the possession of land is determined by positive constitutions.” Id.
126. Id. at 75.
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continued for the same time only that the act of possession lasted.”127 The
combination of this insecure private property and limited land and resources
created the need for society to protect private property.128 Society both provided
a way to protect the property and to produce an economic order, which allowed
people to use their property and the talents of their labor most productively.129
Blackstone also believed in the ability of the state to take private property on the
payment of a reasonable price.130
Adam Smith theorized that people gain a greater sense of property as society
passes through stages of development.131 Smith noted that occupation in these
stages creates property, in that a person who spends time and energy acquiring
something (in his example, an apple) enjoys title to that thing.132 While Smith
approached property ownership from the perspective of the occupation society
was in, as opposed to pure labor and need based acquisition, the similarities
between his philosophy and that of Locke and Blackstone are abundantly
clear.133
In his essay on property, Madison stated that the government’s purpose is to
secure property, regardless of whether it is a tangible thing or an intangible
right.134 Madison believed that, even while property is at risk in the political
process, the government that the Founders created had the instruments to protect
it.135 Madison also argued that a government does not live up to its purpose
127. BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 3.
128. Id. at 7–8. Blackstone also criticized the acquisition of property of other countries, stating:
But how far the seizing on countries already peopled, and driving out and massacring the
innocent and defenceless natives, merely because they differed from their invaders in
language, in religion, in customs, in government, or in colour; how far such a conduct
was consonant to nature, to reason, or to Christianity, deserved well to be considered by
those who have rendered their names immortal by thus civilizing mankind.
Id. at 7.
129. Id. at 8, 15.
130. Eminent Domain, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (citing JOHN E. NOWAK &
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.11, at 424–25 (4th ed. 1991)).
131. Smith, supra note 14, at 126. See supra Section I.
132. Smith, supra note 14, at 122–23.
133. See supra Section I. In her article tracing Smith’s influence through the United States
judicial system, Robin Paul Malloy commented on the significant increase in judicial citations to
Smith’s works since the 1970s. Robin Paul Malloy, Adam Smith in the Courts of the United States,
56 LOY. L. REV. 33, 61, 64 (2010). She pointed out that Smith’s work was omitted from citations
in many contemporary and controversial cases regarding private property rights, including Nollan
v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994),
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), and Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S.
469 (2005). Id. at 59–60 n.105–08. She explains this in the context of the fear of reviving Lochnerera minimal regulations on private property. Id. at 60. She argued that “avoiding overt references
to Smith may have been strategically prudent for those lawyers and jurists hoping to deregulate
land use while seeking to promote the idea that self-interested property owners can best coordinate
land controls through the convergence of private and public interest in the free marketplace.” Id.
134. Madison, supra note 16, at 186.
135. Treanor, supra note 6, at 843.
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when it neglects to protect an individual’s enjoyment of property or free choice
in occupations, the latter of which is both property and the means to acquire
property.136
Economic productivity has been in competition with individual property
rights throughout American history. In comparing historical Native American
land takings to contemporary post-Kelo land takings, Stacy Leeds pointed out
that “[e]minent domain, and similar theories of land allocation, are rarely
discussed when land resources are abundant. But when competing interests eye
a particular tract of land, a hierarchy of preferred land uses emerges.”137 While
both goals are important, they are not always in harmony.
In Native American land cases and laws, the conflict between individual rights
and economic productivity of the land is evident, especially in Chief Justice
Marshall’s opinions.138 Marshall justified his theory of discovery by stating, in
regard to Native Americans, that “the tribes of Indians inhabiting this country
were fierce savages, whose occupation was war, and whose subsistence was
drawn chiefly from the forest. To leave them in possession of their country, was
to leave the country a wilderness[.]”139 In his opinion, Marshall did not embrace
the ideas of Locke and Smith overtly, since he did not agree that the Native
Americans mixing their labor with their land gave them fee simple title to their
lands, or that the occupation of hunting creates property rights.140 However,
Marshall also did not explicitly deny Native American’s impact on title
acquisition; rather than stripping them of all title, he gave a title of occupancy in
their lands.141 He wanted to both respect the property rights of the Native

136. Madison, supra note 16, at 186.
137. Leeds, supra note 39, at 77.
138. See supra Section II.A.
139. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 590 (1823); see also Leeds, supra note 39,
at 61 (“The Court’s action, though not an exercise of eminent domain, nonetheless constitutes a
taking of a property interest. By judicial action, the federal government took a property interest
away from the original owner by simply declaring that the original owner never held absolute title
in the first place.”).
140. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 592; see also supra Section I.
141. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 591. Some courts have seen Marshall’s discussion of aboriginal title
as a complete rejection of the idea that Native American lands were empty and available for
European discovery and commercial use. Pueblo of Jemez v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 3d 1052,
1097 (D.N.M. 2018). But some scholars see Marshall’s argument as an attempt to reconcile the
imperialist structure of America with the contemporary distain for it in politics. PURDY, supra note
27, at 71. Purdy stated:
If today’s scholars, lawyers, and legislators did not believe that property regimes should
be judged by how well they promote economic efficiency and secure ordered political
liberty, we would be at a loss to talk about them at all. Marshall’s opinion rests
substantially on values we still embrace, albeit in different programmatic versions, and
to which we lack compelling alternatives.
Id. at 86.
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Americans,142 who occupied the land first, and justify the actions of the settlers,
in part because they used the land in way that Americans viewed as more
economically productive.143
The way the Court discusses the discovery doctrine in relation to other Native
American land cases is of great interest to this Comment. In Cherokee Nation
v. Georgia, Marshall justified the reason why Native Americans tribes did not
constitute foreign states by saying,
They occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent of their
will, which must take effect in point of possession when their right of
possession ceases. Meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage. Their
relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his
guardian.144
In this opinion, the interaction of the discovery theory from Johnson came
into stark contrast with Locke, Smith, and Blackstone’s interpretations of
property ownership.145 Marshall’s opinion in Worcester v. Georgia emphasized
the independence of the Native American tribes and the enforceability of the
discovery doctrine only against other Europeans.146 Marshall said,
The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct,
independent political communities, retaining their original natural
rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial,
with the single exception of that imposed by irresistible power, which
excluded them from intercourse with any other European potentate
than the first discoverer of the coast of the particular region claimed:
and this was a restriction which those European potentates imposed on
themselves, as well as on the Indians.147

142. The manner in which Marshall discusses Native American property rights seems to hold
more reverence for making the philosophical understanding of property ownership conform to the
competing claims of title in this case than for the rights of Native American people themselves. See
supra Sections I, II.A. The legal arguments he made were reflective of a desire to avoid losing
American settlor’s use of land and their individual right to own property. See Johnson, 21 U.S. at
592.
143. See supra Section II.
144. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831). Justice Johnson, in his dissent,
discussed the limitations of the treaties that the Cherokees entered into with the United States,
saying,
It is clear that it was intended to give them no other rights over the territory than what
were needed by a race of hunters; and it is not easy to see how their advancement beyond
that state of society could ever have been promoted, or, perhaps, permitted, consistently
with the unquestioned rights of the states, or United States, over the territory within their
limits.
Id. at 23 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
145. See supra Section I.
146. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 545 (1832).
147. Id. at 559.
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Here, Marshall had to align the natural rights theory of property ownership
with the discovery justification for the actions of European settlers.148
In Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Railway Co., a case involving both
Native American land and eminent domain, Justice Harlan addressed the
assertion that the congressional act which gave authority to take Cherokee land
to build a railroad might not be a legitimate exercise of eminent domain.149
Harlan quickly dismissed this objection by pointing to the Commerce Clause
and arguing that the United States has the power to regulate commerce among
foreign nations, states, and Native American tribes.150 This is an important
constitutional hook for Harlan’s argument, since the authorization of eminent
domain to the federal government does not discuss relations with Native
American tribes.151 By connecting the Takings Clause with the Commerce
Clause, Harlan not only legitimizes land takings from Native Americans through
eminent domain, but also creates a connection between an eminent domain
taking and federal interest in commerce with Native American tribes.152 The
arguments in this section of his opinion are very similar to contemporary
arguments for a broad understanding of public use, contending that, even if the
act of eminent domain gives a private benefit, it can be justified by the public
benefit.153 Here, the public and commercial value of a railroad was prioritized
over the private ownership of Native American lands, even though the railroad
was a private corporation.154 While there was a public purpose to the use of the
148. Marshall clearly struggles with this dichotomy in the text of this opinion. At one point,
he said,
Did these adventurers, by sailing along the coast, and occasionally landing on it, acquire
for the several governments to whom they belonged, or by whom they were
commissioned, a rightful property in the soil, from the Atlantic to the Pacific; or rightful
dominion over the numerous people who occupied it? Or has nature, or the great Creator
of all things, conferred these rights over hunters and fishermen, on agriculturists and
manufacturers?
Id. at 543. A straightforward reading of the discovery theory would align with the former and a
decision principled on Locke, Smith, and Blackstone would align with the latter. However,
Marshall refused to commit entirely to either principle.
149. Cherokee Nation v. S. Kan. Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641, 657 (1890).
150. Id.
151. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. V. (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.”), with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. (“The Congress shall have Power
to Lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defense and general Welfare of the United States . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes[.]”).
152. Southern Kan. Ry., 135 U.S. at 657.
153. Id. at 657–58. See generally Fed. Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S.
99 (1960) (using the Commerce Clause of the Constitution to justify eminent domain held both by
the United States and in fee simple by the tribe).
154. Southern Kan. Ry., 135 U.S. at 657. Justice Harlan contended that, while “[i]t is true, that
the company authorized to construct and maintain [the railroad] is a corporation created by the laws
of a State . . . it is none the less a fit instrumentality to accomplish the public objects contemplated
by the act of 1884.” Id.
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railroad, the Court ultimately had to make a decision between private ownership
and economic development in the context of eminent domain.
Congressional actions during the push for Native American removal and
allocation also reflected a desire to encourage Native Americans to use their land
in an economically productive way or to allow white settlers to acquire more
Native American land.155 And, when Congress eventually took action to rectify
the hardship its policies imposed on Native Americans, one of the justifications
was reinvigorating the economies of the Native American tribes to promote their
own self-governance.156
In valuing land for eminent domain through judicial history and traditional
appraisal practices, the economic potential of land is often prioritized.157
Through fair market value and the highest and best use standard, we use
indicators reflecting the current and future economic value of the land.158 Often
citing back to Olson v. United States, courts sometimes refer to highest and best
use as “the reasonably probable and legal use of vacant land or improved
property, which is physically possible, appropriately supported, financially
feasible, and that results in the highest value.”159 Indeed, many factors are
considered in this valuation, such as “market demand, economic development in
the area, specific plans of businesses and individuals (including action already
taken to develop the property for that purpose), and the use to which the property
is devoted at the time of the taking.”160
In Supreme Court cases, most notably in the Kelo decision, economic
development as a public purpose has been accepted.161 Justices O’Connor and
Thomas wrote impassioned dissents to Kelo.162 O’Connor argued that leaving
the decision of what constitutes public use to state legislatures minimizes the

155. See supra Section II.B. Arguably, Native Americans at this time already used their land
in what those in power would have considered an economically productive manner. While the
federal government argued that the Native Americans were unproductive because they did not
acknowledge individual land property rights, many tribes did in fact have recognition of these
rights—either in personal property or in land—mostly for agricultural tribes. Bobroff, supra note
50, at 1572–73. This has been referred to as “allotment’s myth of common ownership.” Leeds,
supra note 39, at 64, 77.
156. See supra Section II.B.
157. See supra Section III.B.
158. See supra Section III.B.
159. Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v. United States, 787 F.3d 1111, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting
Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934)).
160. 4 NICHOLS, supra note 63, § 13.01(8)(b).
161. See supra Section III.C.
162. See generally Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 494 (2005) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting); id. at 505 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Of relevant note, Justice O’Connor concluded her
dissent with a quote from James Madison’s essay on property, regarding the need for the
government to secure individual property. Id. at 505 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas
similarly began his dissent with a quote from William Blackstone, concerning the preeminence of
private property rights over public need. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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importance of the constitutional provision for eminent domain.163 She
advocated for a “judicial check on how the public use requirement is
interpreted[.]”164 Moreover, she distinguished the Berman v. Parker and Hawaii
Housing Authority v. Midkiff decisions, on which the majority rested much of its
argument for economic development as a public use, because those decisions
eliminated a harmful use and conferred a public benefit.165 According to
O’Connor, since the landowners’ properties were not “the source of any social
harm[,]” there was no harmful use for the city to eliminate.166
Thomas agreed with O’Connor that a public purpose determination by
legislatures minimizes the impact of the Constitution’s public use clause, and
then went on to argue that the majority’s public purpose theory is inconsistent
with the text of the Constitution.167 He then pointed to the impact the case could
have on economically strained communities.168 While acknowledging that
compensation is paid to land owners, he contended that “no compensation is
possible for the subjective value of these lands to the individuals displaced and
the indignity inflicted by uprooting them from their homes.”169 He also
highlighted the ease of pushing this burden onto poor communities: “Those
communities are not only systemically less likely to put their lands to the highest
and best social use, but are also the least politically powerful.”170 In these two
short quotes, Thomas pointed to the problem of qualifying economic
development as a public purpose, and the inherent inequities in creating a system
which predominantly values land based on economic productivity.171
Many states and Congress, seeing the potential to use this power unjustly,
enacted restrictions to limit this power and increase compensation to land
owners.172 While this response provides some restitution for the people affected
by eminent domain, the inconsistency in state policies and problems with
“blight” designations for eminent domain threaten individual land ownership in

163. Id. at 497 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 480–83 (majority opinion), 500–01 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see Hawaii Hous.
Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984) (finding that the use of eminent domain for a private
party to private party transfer did not confer a benefit on a private party, rather, it eliminated “evils
of concentrated property ownership in Hawaii” which was deemed a public purpose); Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 28, 32–34 (1954) (upholding a law allowing D.C. to take land considered
“slums” through eminent domain for redevelopment, which could include selling or leasing the
land to private parties, because the legislature has broad authority to determine its the public
purpose).
166. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 500–01 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
167. See id. at 506–511 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 521.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See supra Sections III.C, III.D.
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favor of furthering economic development.173 In Dana Berliner’s article, she
stated that uneven regulations of constitutional rights do not adequately protect
those rights.174 Some scholars posed alternative solutions to make just
compensation more equitable for land owners.175 Those theories focused on the
landowner’s enjoyment of development project profits, compensation based on
length of home ownership, or a subjective standard for landowners.176
V. A BETTER DEFINITION OF HIGHEST AND BEST USE
Suggestions to change just compensation standards are hardly a new concept.
Immediately after the Kelo decision, many scholars gave recommendations to
create new standards for either the public use or just compensation requirements
of eminent domain.177 However, these suggestions often resulted in solutions
that were inconsistent, highly standardized, or highly individualized to the point
of being broad and nebulous.178 This Comment suggests a correction to just
compensative valuation that is a more middle-of-the-road approach. It is one
that incorporates factors specific to landowners, while remaining broad enough
to be adopted by both the states and the federal government.
The highest and best use standard needs to be broadened to include factors
that consider not only the highest and best economic use of the property, but the
highest and best use that is personal to the individual.179 This specified
assessment does not have to be as broad as Professor Lopez suggested in his
article.180 Courts and legislatures often shy away from enacting standards of
individual harm to compensation calculations, because it is harder to quantify,
and they tend to favor uniform standards which give a percentage increase in
compensation to homeowners or farmers.181 In his treatise on property value,
James C. Bonbright acknowledges courts’ dislike of using sentimental value to
the property owner in valuation, but contrasts this by pointing to courts that have
offered owners compensation for destroyed property based on its “intrinsic
value”—a value that seems to approximate the cost of recreating the property.182
Some may argue that the specific economic conditions of a property are more
easily quantifiable than the personal harm caused by the loss of the property;
however, state and federal precedent show that expenses—such as moving
expenses and interest on the land—can be incorporated into a compensation

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

See supra Section III.D.
Berliner, supra note 95, at 90.
See supra Section III.D.
See supra Section III.D.
See supra Sections III.C, III.D.
See supra Sections III.C, III.D, IV.
See supra Sections III.B, III.D for a discussion of the highest and best use definition.
See Lopez, supra note 25, at 299.
See supra Section III.D; IV.
1 BONBRIGHT, supra note 71, at 90–91.
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calculation.183 These examples show the inclusion of more than fair market
value or highest and best use calculations in valuation. Additionally, land
appraisers consider the individual economic circumstances of the land to value
the property.184 They look at “market demand, economic development in the
area, specific plans of businesses and individuals (including action already taken
to develop the property for that purpose), and the use to which the property is
devoted at the time of the taking[,]” to consider what the economic value of the
property is.185 Indeed, Michael Rikon, in his essay The Highest and Best Use
Concept in Condemnation, contended that “[h]ighest and best use is not a static
concept, but one that fluctuates pursuant to changes in market value, land use
regulations and available engineering techniques.”186
The highest and best use definition can be re-written as a two-part definition:
(1) “The reasonably probable use of property that results in the highest economic
value[,]” and (2) the personal value to the property owner.187 In the same way
that the economic standard of highest and best use has additional factors to
consider in valuation of property,188 courts can incorporate similar factors to the
personal value standard. These could include: (1) length of time at the property,
(2) non-economic relocation costs (such as distance from friends and relatives),
(3) significant life events which occurred on the property, and (4) unique or
irreplaceable modifications to the property (such as a family member who built
a deck for the family to use on the property). Length of time at the property can
be valued similarly to the way the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) determines the
marital property of the decedent’s estate for the spouse’s elective share—the
amount a spouse can take from the estate in lieu of their share from the will—
which is a graduated percentage of the estate.189 It could be a percentage of the
property value, a fixed amount for each additional year at the property, or a
combination of both. Further, life events and modifications to the property could
be valued based on their likelihood of recreation (e.g., a wedding or a porch
created by a deceased relative cannot be recreated) and the cumulative effect of
regular events at a specific location. Each of these events can be assigned a
specific monetary value, which would be added to the final value. These
standards could form a basis for the unique conditions of the property to be
valued against, since they are unlikely to be a one-to-one match with the property
in question. In addition to the economic standards, these standards could help
form a more complete definition of highest and best use.

183. See supra Section III.B.
184. 4 NICHOLS, supra note 63, § 13.01(8)(b); see supra Section III.B.
185. 4 NICHOLS, supra note 63, § 13.01(8)(b); see supra Section III.B.
186. Rikon, supra note 79, at 47.
187. Savin, supra note 77; see also 4 NICHOLS, supra note 63, § 13.01(8)(b).
188. Masterman, supra note 75, at 91 (listing the criteria of “(1) legal permissibility, (2)
physical possibility, [and] (3) financial feasibility”).
189. SUSAN N. GARY ET AL., CONTEMPORARY TRUSTS AND ESTATES 624 (3d ed. 2017).
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In order to prove the value to the property owner, a landowner impact
statement should be used in the analysis of the highest and best use. This
statement could be modeled after a combination of victim impact statements
(VIS) and environmental impact statements (EIS). In criminal cases, VIS can
be used to give the sentencing judge or jury context of the harm the victim
suffered as a result of the defendant’s action.190 In the context of a capital
offense case, the Supreme Court commented on the use of victim impact
statements by saying, “just as the murderer should be considered as an
individual, so too the victim is an individual whose death represents a unique
loss to society and in particular to his family.”191 Just as both the defendant and
the victim should be considered in sentencing for criminal cases, so too should
both the economic and personal value of land be considered in making a highest
and best use determination. An impact statement gives landowners a way to
express the personal value of their land, which can be considered alongside the
economic analysis. However, there is a threat that the landowner will exaggerate
the personal value of their property to unfairly make additional money from the
government’s just compensation payment. To counteract this, the EIS model
should also be used.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c), a government agency must create an EIS when
their action “significantly affect[s] the quality of the human environment[.]”192
While there are many purposes of an EIS, the Congressional goal is for the
agency to consider the environmental ramifications of their actions—or a private
party’s—while the proposal is still being formulated.193 Federal court standards
for evaluating the adequacy of an EIS differ, but most look for whether it is
sufficiently detailed and researched, proposes alternatives, and gives the public

190. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991).
191. Payne, 501 U.S. at 825 (quoting Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 469, 517 (1991) (White, J.,
dissenting) overruled by Payne, 501 U.S. at 830). Mitchell Frank criticized victim impact evidence,
such as photographs or edited movies showing the victim’s life, and the Supreme Court’s lack of
boundaries on it because it has a prejudicial effect on juries. Mitchell J. Frank, From Simple
Statements to Heartbreaking Photographs and Videos: An Interdisciplinary Examination of Victim
Impact Evidence in Criminal Cases, 45 STETSON L. REV. 203, 206, 239–40, 252–53 (2016).
Similarly, Amy Phillips points to the jury’s likelihood of taking the “worth” of the victim into
account in sentencing in capital cases. Amy K. Phillips, Thou Shalt Not Kill Any Nice People: The
Problem of Victim Impact Statements in Capital Sentencing, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 93, 105–06
(1997).
192. National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (2012).
193. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 409–10 (1976). Scholars have pointed out the lack
of power the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) has in reversing decisions that harm the
environment, and have identified the threat of agencies not considering the full range of alternatives
to the project. James Allen, Note, NEPA Alternatives Analysis: The Evolving Exclusion of Remote
and Speculative Alternatives, 25 J. LAND RES. & ENV’T. L. 287, 315–16 (2005); Michael C. Blumm
& Keith Mosman, The Overlooked Role of the National Environmental Policy Act in Protecting the
Western Environment: NEPA in the Ninth Circuit, 2 WASH. J. ENV’T. L. & POL’Y 193, 195 (2012).
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information about the environmental impact of the project.194 Within the context
of the highest and best use standard, the governmental body that proposes the
condemnation could work with the landowner to create the landowner impact
statement. This creates a distilled explanation of the landowner’s personal
value.
The landowner impact statement should have elements that are similar to both
a VIS and an EIS. It should contain a description of the personal value of the
land to the landowner, provided by that person, and the information should be
verified by the landowner with documents on relatives in the description, birth
and death certificates, building permits, and other pieces of evidence which
corroborate their story. While proof of an exact story might not be obtainable,
people and their locations or events can be identified to substantiate the personal
value description. The governmental body will have the ability to review the
description and evidence, as well as the ability to only include in the final
landowner impact statement the parts of the description that can be substantiated.
In implementing landowner impact statements, the legal profession will need to
rely on appraisal associations for guidance as to the kind of evidence that could
help substantiate a landowner’s personal value claim.
As “highest and best use” is a term of art used by courts and appraisers, both
would need to adopt the modified definition. A lack of simultaneous agreement
from both groups could create problems and lead to compensation appraisals and
court rulings that are not in line with the new definition. For this reason, even
though highest and best use is not defined in statutes relating to condemnation,
Congress should enact a statute modifying the definition. This will allow courts
and appraisers to change their standards as a response to Congress. Further, it
will follow many of the similar changes states have made to their condemnation
laws, could encourage the holdout states to modify their eminent domain laws,
and could even become a standard for states to look to when revisiting changes
to their eminent domain laws.
Implementing this standard will have significant impact on the practice of
appraisers. Congress will need to work with appraisal associations to ensure this
new standard will be uniform and avoid complicated transaction costs. Congress
should inquire into the time added to appraisals and cases, costs of procuring
documentation, and education for lawyers and appraisers on the new standard.
This standard is balanced in that it compensates landowners for personal loss,
while requiring them to prove that the loss; however, it will still require large
changes in the existing system which necessitates cooperation and insight from
all involved.

194. See Mississippi River Basin All. v. Westphal, 230 F.3d 170, 174 (5th Cir. 2000) (listing
ESI criteria within the Fifth Circuit); Citizens Against Toxic Sprays, Inc. v. Bergland, 428 F. Supp.
908, 922 (D. Or. 1977) (“An EIS is adequate only if it serves substantially the two basic purposes
for which it was designated.”); Brooks v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 269, 279–80 (W.D. Wash. 1972)
(detailing ESI requirements).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The revised definition of highest and best allows for the competing values of
economic potential and individual rights to the property to be analyzed together
without placing one superior to the other. Superiority of economic use was one
driving motivation behind taking Native American land and allowing economic
development to become a public use under eminent domain. With the new
definition of highest and best use, we can allow economic development to be a
factor in eminent domain valuation without allowing it to be the only factor.
When highest and best use provides a concrete and accurate representation of
both conflicting interests, we remain true to founding philosophies of property
rights, and allow the valuation system to consider both of these goals more
comprehensively.
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